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The Rhode Island General Assembly in
the Defense of Civil Liberties
Steven Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION
"This country has come to feel the same when Congress is in
session as we do when the baby gets hold of the hammer. It's just
a question of how much damage he can do with it before you can
take it away from him."' This Will Rogers barb may have been
aimed at Congress, but many people would probably consider it
just as applicable to the work of the Rhode Island General
Assembly.
Particularly for individuals and organizations concerned
about the protection of civil rights and civil liberties, it is the
federal courts, not state legislatures, that have often been
considered the bulwark of protection for individual rights. In that
regard, there is little question that the Rhode Island General
Assembly has enacted more than its fair share of constitutionally
questionable legislation requiring court intercession.2 Yet any
historian of civil liberties knows that the view of the federal
judiciary as a consistently aggressive guardian of individual rights
* Steven Brown is executive director of the Rhode Island Affiliate, American
Civil Liberties Union (RIACLU). In the interest of full disclosure, it should
be noted that RIACLU was involved in the key litigation and advocacy
activities analyzed in the text.
1. BRYAN STERLING, THE BEST OF WILL ROGERS 33-34 (1979).
2. A cursory review of the RIACLU's legal docket in the past thirty
years turns up no fewer than twenty-five court decisions striking down Rhode
Island statutes. See, e.g., RIACLU v. Begin, 431 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D.R.I. 2006)
(finding unconstitutional various provisions of state campaign finance
statute); Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.R.I.
1999) (striking down a law banning so-called "partial birth abortions").
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does not hold up to much scrutiny.3 It has thus become important
to look to the states - at both the judicial and legislative levels -
for civil rights protections. To the benefit of the state's residents,
the Rhode Island General Assembly has, on a number of occasions,
taken the lead in countering court decisions that were adverse to
individual rights. 4
This Article will first briefly examine two recent high-profile
issues addressed by the General Assembly to show the positive
role it can take in protecting civil liberties and civil rights.
Though national in scope, these two issues - racial profiling and
"homeland security" - have played out in important ways at the
state level. On the issue of racial profiling, this Article examines
both the outcome of a recent federal court case in Rhode Island
that challenged "racial profiling" by local police and the General
Assembly's response to it. In the second instance, this Article
describes how the General Assembly took an aggressive pro-active
stance in response to gubernatorial "homeland security"
legislation that had an enormous negative impact on the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms. This examination attempts to
3. Almost thirty years ago, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William
Brennan, Jr. issued a call for reinvigoration of enforcement of state
constitutional guarantees, describing how "[u]nder the banner of the vague,
undefined notions of equity, comity and federalism the [U.S. Supreme] Court
has condoned both isolated and systematic violations of civil liberties."
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1990) (citations omitted).
4. For example, Rhode Island was one of the first states to enact
legislation responding to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), significantly reducing the protection
of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-80.1-
1 et seq., the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act." The General Assembly
strengthened the state's protections for people with disabilities in the Fair
Employment Practices Act (FEPA), R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-5-6(4) (2003), after
the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471
(1999), that the federal law on which FEPA was based did not protect people
whose disabilities could be controlled with mitigating measures. 2000 R.I.
Pub. Laws 2479. Rhode Island remains in the distinct minority of states to
enact legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of
sexual orientation or "gender identity or expression." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-5
(2003). Of course, the General Assembly's record in regards to anti-
discrimination protection is not spotless. See, e.g., Melendez v. Town of North
Smithfield, No. 03-372 (D.R.I. 2003) (challenging, inter alia, P.L. 2003,
Chapter 276, allowing the Town of North Smithfield to acquire (an all-white,
all-male) private fire and rescue service and exempting the acquisition from
any challenge under FEPA).
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demonstrate that the state legislature sometimes plays a role as
important as the judiciary in safeguarding individual freedoms.
II. RACIAL PROFILING
The belief that our criminal justice system is color-blind is
cherished in our society, but it is a belief difficult to reconcile with
the facts. Rather, from arrest to prosecution to conviction to
sentencing, the presence of race (and class) discrimination in the
criminal justice system is difficult to ignore.5 For a variety of
reasons, the inequitable enforcement, prosecution and
implementation of the criminal laws remains a troubling reminder
of the difficulties faced by racial minorities in seeking to use the
courts to vindicate their right to be free from discriminatory law
enforcement practices.6
At the front end of the criminal justice system, for example,
the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the use of "pretext stops" by
police, which has a significant impact on the problem of racial
profiling. 7 The Court's notions of how a "reasonable person"
should be able to "just say no" to police in the context of "consent"
searches sometimes seem to border on the surreal, and give
enormous discretion to police to engage in dragnet searches that
can have a racially discriminatory impact.8 To top it off, the Court
has set a very high burden for defendants to meet to be entitled to
discovery on a claim that they have been singled out for
5. For an excellent examination of the disturbing and prevalent role of
race throughout the criminal justice system, see DAVID COLE, No EQUAL
JUSTICE (1999).
6. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to intentional
discrimination, not to laws or actions that have a disparate impact on the
basis of race. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Among the many other judicially-created barriers
are broad limits on plaintiff standing to enjoin questionable police practices
and the judicially-created doctrine of "qualified immunity" that has been
expansively interpreted in the law enforcement context to protect from
damages actions "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law." See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
7. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). See also COLE, supra
note 5, at 34-41.
8. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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prosecution on the basis of race.9
At the back end of the criminal justice system, studies
documenting the discriminatory impact of various sentencing
policies and practices are legion. For example, despite significant
statistical evidence of the racially discriminatory administration
of capital punishment, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to find
the racially charged evidence sufficient to invalidate a defendant's
death sentence.' 0  Additionally, the federal penalty scheme
markedly differentiates between crack and powder cocaine to the
detriment of racial minorities, and has been the subject of
enormous commentary and criticism.11 The U.S. Supreme Court
has indirectly acknowledged the discriminatory impact, 12 but legal
challenges to the sentencing disparity have been uniformly
unsuccessful. 13  Indeed, even after the U.S. Supreme Court
eliminated the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Commission
Guidelines that housed the discriminatory crack and powder
9. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1990).
10. McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279.
11. The statutory situation was summarized as follows in a recent
decision by Judge Smith:
The central pillars of the 1986 [Anti-Drug Abuse] Act are its
schedule of mandatory minimum sentences for weight-based
possession with intent to distribute, and the upward ratchet for
recidivist offenders. Mandatory minimums under the statute begin
at 5 and 10 years, respectively, depending on drug quantity, double
for a second offense, and, in certain cases, mandate life
imprisonment for a third. See 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B). The
quantity-based penalty scheme under the statute employs a 100:1
ratio for cocaine base to powder cocaine, which means that the
amount of powder cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory
mandatory minimum is 100 times the amount of cocaine base
necessary to trigger the same minimum sentence. Thus, it takes 500
grams or more of powder cocaine to trigger a 5-year mandatory
minimum penalty whereas only 5 grams of cocaine base triggers the
5-year minimum; it takes 5,000 grams (5 kilograms) of powder
cocaine to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum penalty under the
statute, whereas 50 grams or more of cocaine base will trigger this
same penalty.
United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 289 (D.R.I. 2005).
12. In United States v. Armstrong, the Court cited the fact that "more
than 90% of the persons sentenced in 1994 for crack cocaine trafficking were
black." Ironically, the reference appears in a court decision that made it more
difficult for defendants to mount challenges to allegedly racially
discriminatory charging decisions. 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 1994).
IN THE DEFENSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
cocaine disparity, 14 judges, including those in the federal court in
Rhode Island, found themselves stymied in trying to reduce the
racial injustice inherent in those sentencing standards. 15
Even favorable court rulings can amount to promises
unfulfilled. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled a nineteen-
year-old precedent to ease the evidentiary burden on defendants
seeking to challenge a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
to exclude individuals from petit juries on the basis of their race. 16
However, under the three-tier burden-shifting scheme adopted by
the Court, prosecutors can rebut a defendant's prima facie case
and force the defendant to prove purposeful discrimination,
merely by offering a race-neutral explanation for a juror strike
that need not be "persuasive, or even plausible." 17
14. Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
15. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006).
16. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
17. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-768 (1995):
Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory
challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination
(step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the
strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If
a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then
decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved
purposeful racial discrimination. The second step of this process does
not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. "At
this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the
prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent
in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed
race neutral."
(citations omitted).
That the Batson standard can be rather toothless is perhaps best
exemplified by a Fifth Circuit case in which the government used six of its
peremptory challenges to strike Mexican-Americans from the jury of a Latino
defendant facing drug charges. See United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d
834 (5th Cir. 1989). The prosecutor's explanation for dismissing one of the
jurors was that he had "a P rule. I never accept anyone whose occupation
begins with a P. He is a pipeline operator." Id. at 837. The appellate court
remanded the case because the district court failed to make any findings of
race-neutrality under Batson's second step. At an evidentiary hearing on
remand, the prosecutor repeated his adherence to the "P" rule, but added for
the first time that he also rejected that particular juror because the
prosecutor "had been informed that the use of marihuana by pipeline
operators was somewhat prevalent." United States v. Romero-Reyna, 889
F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1989). As the appellate court noted, the district court
rejected the "P" rule explanation, pointing out that the prosecutor had
accepted three Anglos whose occupations began with the letter "P."
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It is therefore worth examining how one particular well-
known racial justice issue has played out in the courtrooms and in
the halls of the General Assembly in Rhode Island. That issue is
the practice of "racial profiling" on the state's roads and
highways. 18 Concerns about inappropriate stops and searches of
blacks and Hispanics, in particular, go back more than a decade
and are generally traced to increased efforts at drug interdiction
by police. 19 In Rhode Island, when State Police created a drug
interdiction squad in 1990, records showed that of the first 28
people arrested, 22 of them were Hispanic. 20 When the State
Police voluntarily collected data about traffic stops in 1999, the
statistics showed that 26% of motorists stopped during a three-
month period were non-white, even though they made up only 8%
of the state's population.21  Not surprisingly, police officials
vigorously rejected the implications of the statistics.22
However, in 2000, in light of both the troubling nature of
those statistics and the tragic death of Cornel Young, Jr., an off-
duty African-American Providence police officer shot to death by a
Nonetheless, the district court found that the revised explanation passed
muster under Batson, and the appellate court then upheld the revised
finding. Id.
18. State law defines racial profiling as
the detention, interdiction or other disparate treatment of an
individual on the basis, in whole or in part, of the racial or ethnic
status of such individual, except when such status is used in
combination with other identifying factors seeking to apprehend a
specific suspect whose racial or ethnic status is part of the
description of the suspect, which description is timely and reliable.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-21.2-3.
19. The government's use of "drug courier profiles" has been particularly
prominent in promoting racial discrimination. According to author David
Cole, "a Lexis review of all federal court decisions from January 1, 1990, to
August 2, 1995, in which drug-courier profiles were used and the race of the
suspect was discernible revealed that of sixty-three such cases, all but three
suspects were minorities: thirty-four were black, twenty-five were Hispanic,
one was Asian, and three were white." See COLE, supra note 5, at 50; see also
United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J.,
dissenting) (calling the drug courier profile "laughable, because it is so fluid
that it can be used to justify designating anyone a potential drug courier if
the DEA agents so choose").
20. Dan Barry, Hispanic Arrests Irk ACLU, PROVIDENCE J., May 12,
1990.
21. Bruce Landis, State Police Records Support Charges of Bias in Traffic
Stops, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 5, 1999, at 1A.
22. Id.
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fellow officer, 23 the General Assembly passed a groundbreaking
law requiring all police departments in the state to collect detailed
traffic stop statistical data for two years. 24 The statute further
required the Attorney General to
procure the services of an organization, company, person
or other entity with sufficient expertise in the field of
statistics to assist with ... the design of the methodology
for gathering statistics pursuant to this chapter, monitor
compliance with the act throughout the study, and
conduct a statistical analysis at the conclusion of the
study to determine the extent to which racial profiling
exists within the state.2 5
Northeastern University's Institute on Race and Justice was the
entity hired to perform this independent analysis. The results of
the Institute's study, released in 2003, provided clear evidence of
widespread racial disparities in traffic stop practices across the
state. 26 The study showed that blacks and Hispanics were both
disproportionately stopped and searched by police, but they were
actually less likely than whites to be found with contraband, and
that the disparities held true when other relevant variables were
controlled. 27
At the same time that this legislatively-mandated study was
being conducted, a federal lawsuit alleging racial profiling was
proceeding in Rhode Island.2 8 The lawsuit's failure is a cautionary
tale, for it exposes the difficulties faced by individuals seeking to
use the legal system to redress incidents of racial profiling and
23. The circumstances of the shooting are summarized in the court
opinions addressing civil rights claims brought against the city by the
decedent's family. Young v. City of Providence, 301 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.R.I.
2004), vacated, 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005).
24. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 31-21.1-1 et seq. (The Racial Profiling Prevention
Act of 2004).
25. R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-21.1-4(f).
26. Dr. Amy Farrell, Dean Jack McDevitt, Shea Cronin and Erica Pierce,
"Rhode Island Traffic Stops Statistics Act Final Report - Executive
Summary," Northeastern University Institute on Race and Justice, June 30,
2003, available at http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/IRJdocs!
RIFinalReportExecSummary.pdf.
27. Id.
28. Flowers v. Fiore, 239 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D.R.I. 2003) ("Flowers "); affl'd,
359 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Flowers IF').
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highlights the need for other responses, such as legislative action,
to address this critical issue.
On September 24th, 2000,29 Bernard Flowers, a 50-year old
African-American schoolteacher, 30 was subjected to a "high risk"
or "felony" car stop by Westerly police. 31  With three police
weapons, including a shotgun, pointed directly at him, Flowers
was directed by the lead officer at the scene to first "extend his
arms out the window and then open the car door and exit the
vehicle," then to "turn around with his hands in the air and walk
backwards towards the officers," and "to kneel on the road beside
his car and lace his fingers behind his head," whereupon he was
"handcuffed, frisked, and placed in the back of [an officer's]
cruiser."32
This "traumatic event" where "any citizen would be
understandably upset"33 was precipitated by a report to Westerly
police at 11:55 AM that day from a town resident, Nuncio
Gaccione, who said he had "got[ten] word that [a person he knew]
was sending two colored people over here to start some trouble. '34
When police officer Darren Fiore arrived at Gaccione's house
about five minutes later, Gaccione "related that he received a call
from Maurice O'Rourke, who stated that another individual,
Michael Corbin, was sending two African-American men to
Gaccione's home with a gun. Gaccione said that he believed this
was because his grandson, Jason Bolduc, 'works with a guy that
Corbin knows and they had some type of falling out.'' 35
Following up on this "second-hand and somewhat disjointed"
29. Both the district court and First Circuit opinions mistakenly cite the
date of the incident as "September 24, 2001," not 2000. The suit was actually
filed May 15, 2001. See, e.g., Andrew Goldsmith, A Question of Race,
PROVIDENCE J., May 16, 2001, at lB.
30. Although an opinion concurring in the judgment in the First Circuit
mentions that Flowers was of "middle age," his exact age and occupation
come from news reports, not the published opinions. Flowers II, 359 F.3d at
35. See also Goldsmith, supra note 29.
31. Flowers II, 359 F.3d at 27.
32. Id.
33. Flowers I, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 179. The plaintiff publicly summarized
the stop as follows: "I saw what I called a firing squad... I could see the guns
just pointed at me. ... If I were to move at any rate I would be shot. It was
time for me to make peace for my death." Goldsmith, supra note 29.
34. Flowers II, 359 F.3d at 26.
35. Id.
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narrative,36 Gaccione told officer Fiore that "he had seen two
African-American men in a small gray or black vehicle drive by
his home about five minutes prior to Fiore's arrival" and that
"these men may have been the ones to whom O'Rourke referred."37
A few minutes later, "Fiore alerted on his radio that police should
be looking for a small gray or black vehicle with two black men,
possibly armed. He further stated that he was 'not too sure what it
is"' and added (erroneously) that "they made threats over here at
the Gaccione complex. '38
Fiore then took a post about half a mile from the residence,
along Route 3, a major thoroughfare in Westerly. Approximately
half an hour later,39 Flowers' "small gray car" passed by, and Fiore
decided to follow it.40 Although he noticed Flowers was alone in
the car, Fiore later explained that he believed that the other
suspect either could have been dropped off at another location or
was hiding in the vehicle. 41  He pulled Flowers over after
approximately one mile.4 2 Back-up arrived, and the previously-
described "felony car stop" ensued. After a search of Flowers and
the car turned up nothing criminal, Flowers was ordered back to
his car and allowed to leave.43
Fiore described his "probable cause" for stopping the vehicle
as being that "the description of the vehicle fit the description by
Mr. Gaccione, there was a black male that was operating the
vehicle . . . the close proximity of the time of the call and the fact
that it was heading toward Mr. Gaccione's residence. 44
Flowers filed a §198345 civil rights suit against Fiore, the two
officers who assisted in the felony stop, and the Town of Westerly,
alleging violations, inter alia, of his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, and of his right to be free from racial discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The
36. Id. at 35 (Boudin, C.J., concurring).
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 26, 33.
40. Id. at 26-27.
41. Id. at 27.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 27-28.
44. Id. at 27.
45. 42 U.S.C. §1983.
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key issue in the case was whether the police had proper grounds
to stop Flowers' car.
A police officer may, in appropriate circumstances, stop a
person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior
even though there is no probable cause to arrest.46 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that to justify such a stop, known as a
Terry stop, the officer must be able to point to "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. '47 While
reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause, the officer must be able to articulate more than an
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"' of criminal
activity.48
In determining whether officers have a reasonable suspicion,
courts examine the totality of the circumstances of each case to
see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. 49 Whether a stop
remains related in scope to the circumstances justifying the
interference is judged by a standard of objective reasonableness.
The court considers the circumstances as a whole, and balances
the nature of the intrusion with the governmental interests that
are served.50
Although, as discussed infra, the police appeared to have
failed this test miserably in Flowers' case, both the district court
and the court of appeals found otherwise. The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding
that the officers "had ample reason to detain Flowers. '5 1 In
explaining the "ample reason" for dismissing Flowers' claim that
he had been unlawfully stopped, the court stated:
Gaccione reported receiving a threat that two black men
with guns were coming to his home to cause trouble and,
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
47. Id. at 21.
48. Id. at 27.
49. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), United States v.
Golab, 325 F.3d 63, 66 (1st Cir. 2003).
50. United States v. Moore, 235 F.3d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 2000); United
States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1781
(1999).
51. Flowers I, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
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shortly thereafter, he told Fiore that two black men in a
gray or black car had driven slowly by his home. A few
minutes later, Fiore observed Flowers, a black man,
driving toward Gaccione's home in a car fitting the
description provided by Gaccione and bearing license
plates not issued to that vehicle. Consequently, it was
reasonable for Fiore to believe that Flowers was one of
the armed men coming to Gaccione's home to cause
trouble.52
Most striking about this recitation of the incident - which
occurred in the context of the defendants' summary judgment
motion, and so in a context where the facts were to be construed in
the light most favorable to Flowers - is that it contains three
factual errors, all of which undermine Fiore's alleged "probable
cause" for stopping the vehicle.53 First, Flowers was not observed
by Fiore "a few minutes" after leaving Gaccione's home - instead,
the record, substantiated by police logs, indicated that
approximately half an hour had elapsed. 54 Second, although the
district court relied on a statement by Fiore that he had observed
Flowers "driving toward Gaccione's home, '55 the evidence showed,
and the appellate court acknowledged, that Flowers had already
passed Gaccione's residence along Route 3 when he was stopped.56
Finally, despite references to Fiore's discovery of an apparent
discrepancy between the license plate on Flowers' car and the
vehicle's registration, 57  Fiore conceded that the alleged
discrepancy "never figured into his decision to follow and stop
Flowers."5 8
When stripped of these errors, the "probable cause" for the
stop of Flowers amounted to the following: Fiore was looking for
two black men in a "small gray or black vehicle," and Flowers, a
52. Id.
53. These "apparent" errors were acknowledged by the appeals court. See
Flowers II, 359 F.3d at 33.
54. Id. at 26, 33.
55. Flowers I, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
56. Flowers II, 359 F.3d at 33, 36 (Boudin, C.J.).
57. There was a factual dispute as to when Fiore discovered this
"discrepancy," but the appellate court ultimately deemed it irrelevant in light
of Fiore's concession that it was not a factor in his decision to stop Flowers.
See Flowers I, 359 F.3d at 27 n.1.
58. Id. at 33.
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middle-aged African-American man, had the misfortune to drive
along Route 3, alone, a half hour later in a gray car. Despite
acknowledging the district court's "apparent" factual errors and
the need to "constru[e] the facts in a light most favorable to
Flowers,"59 the First Circuit nonetheless upheld the lower court's
grant of summary judgment, finding that the police had engaged
in a reasonable Terry stop under the circumstances. The court's
core reasoning was as follows:
Equipped with a description confirmed by Gaccione's
firsthand observation, it was reasonable for Fiore to
follow the first African-American male in a black or gray
car he observed in the immediate area of the Gaccione
residence. That as long as half an hour may have elapsed
after he left the Gaccione residence (as opposed to twenty
minutes) arguably attenuates the reasonableness of
Fiore's suspicion that Flowers was indeed the suspect.
However, we do not believe that a matter of ten minutes
disposes of suspicion altogether, especially when a car and
driver substantially matching the given description
eventually appear. That Fiore did not see a second
African-American male in the car is adequately countered
by Fiore's explanation that he thought a second man
either could have been dropped off or was hiding in the
car. Against the immediacy and gravity of the reported
threat, Fiore was justified in following through on his
initial observation. 60
Though calling it "a close case," the court concluded "that the
officers possessed sufficient and reasonable suspicion to stop
Flowers."61
In a brief opinion concurring in the judgment, Chief Judge
Boudin examined the evidence supporting the court's opinion and
noted its weaknesses. He pointed out, inter alia, that the initial
tip about the "two black men" was "second-hand and somewhat
disjointed"; that "[g]ray cars are not uncommon; and the one
stopped contained one black man - of middle age - rather than
the two predicted, both of whom would likely have been younger if
59. Id.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 34.
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the story were true"; that "the car was stopped 20 to 30 minutes
after the one allegedly driven by the house"; and that there was no
"clear indication that the plaintiff was driving to the informant's
house at the time he was stopped. '62 Notwithstanding all these
concerns, Chief Judge Boudin concluded that even if the Terry
stop had been improper, the police were still protected by qualified
immunity.63
The Flowers decision gave force to prescient comments made
by Professor David Cole a year before Bernard Flowers was
stopped at gunpoint by Westerly police: "The Supreme Court's
removal of meaningful Fourth Amendment review allows the
police to rely on unparticularized discretion, unsubstantiated
hunches, and nonindividualized suspicion. Racial prejudice and
stereotypes linking racial minorities to crime rush to fill the
void."64
The Flowers case acutely demonstrates the difficulties faced
by alleged victims of racial profiling in obtaining judicial relief
and, perhaps not coincidentally, helps explain why racial profiling
remains such a prevalent problem in Rhode Island.65  The
difficulties are perhaps best summed up by the First Circuit's
incredible claim that the car and driver "substantially match[ed]
the given description." If a generalized description of two black
men driving in a gray or black car is sufficient to justify the stop
and search of a gray car with one black male in it some thirty
minutes later, Fourth Amendment protections would appear to
mean very little. 66
62. Id. at 35-36.
63. Id. at 36.
64. COLE, supra note 5, at 53.
65. Dr. Amy Farrell & Dean Jack McDevitt, "Rhode Island Traffic Stops
Statistics Data Collection Study 2004-2005 - Final Report," Northeastern
University Institute on Race and Justice, Apr. 2006, available at
http://www.rijustice.state.ri.us/sac/Final%20Report%202004-2005.pf. See
also The Persistence of Racial Profiling in Rhode Island: A Nine-Month
Review, Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union, November
2005, available at http://www.riaclu.org/documents/Racialprofiling3rdqtr
report.pdf.
66. The Appellant's brief summed it up this way:
At best, [an impermissible hunch] was all Officer Fiore had when he
chose to stop Mr. Flowers' car and subject him to the terror that
inevitably accompanies a "high risk" stop. The description of the
automobile was vague. The source of the complaint was
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Indeed, calling this a "substantial match" shows how
vulnerable racial minorities are to being stopped and searched. It
is difficult to imagine similar police action if Flowers' race and the
race of the "two colored people" mentioned by the town resident
were changed. If a person had been told that "two white males"
were going to his house with a gun, and he then saw a "gray or
black car" with two white men drive by his house, would police
have relied on such an open-ended and virtually useless
description to pull over the first gray or black car they saw that
had only one white occupant in it? Would a court have called the
match "substantial"?
Having fresh in its mind both the First Circuit's decision in
Flowers and Northeastern University's documentation of racial
disparities in traffic stops in Rhode Island from the data collected
in 2001-2002,67 the General Assembly enacted "The Racial
Profiling Prevention Act of 2004," landmark legislation that took
some important first steps to try to at least partially address a
problem that the Flowers case illustrates may not always be
fruitfully resolved by litigation. The 2004 statute explicitly banned
racial profiling6 8 and authorized the award of damages, attorneys'
fees and other appropriate relief for its victims. 69 It required the
continued collection of traffic stops data by police departments for
another year and obligated police agencies to "review the data on a
regular basis in an effort to determine whether any racial
disparities in the agency's traffic stops enforcement exists, and to
appropriately respond to any such disparities."70
The law also directly addressed certain police procedures
thought to have an impact on racial profiling. In the absence of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity, the
2004 law barred police from engaging in so-called "consent"
questionable. Thirty minutes had passed since Fiore had taken his
"post," and nearly 50 minutes had passed since Gaccione had called
the police. The first - and only - person that Fiore stopped was the
first black man to drive by. As hunches go, this one was shamefully
weak. It should not provide a basis for stopping an innocent man.
Brief of Appellant at 24-25, Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24 (lst Cir. 2004) (No.
03-1170, 03-1533).
67. Farrell et al, supra note 26.
68. R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-21.2-3 (2004).
69. R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-21.2-4 (2004).
70. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.2-6(k) (2004).
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searches (i.e., requesting the driver's permission to search)71 or
from detaining a motor vehicle "beyond the time needed" to
address the traffic violation prompting the stop. 72 To encourage
compliance with these restrictions, the statute further established
an exclusionary rule, barring the judicial use of any evidence
obtained in a search that violated these prohibitions.73
It is still too early to know the impact of the legislation on
police practices, and no one would claim that its passage will, by
itself, solve the problem of racial profiling. On the positive side,
Northeastern University's statistical analysis of the latest year's
worth of traffic stop data did show a reduction in the total number
of searches conducted by police - perhaps due to the new statutory
ban on consent searches - as well as a slight reduction in the
racial disparity in police stops and searches.74 Nonetheless, the
racial disparities in terms of both stops and searches remained
quite significant and hardly cause for celebration.75 The latest
study prompted the introduction of additional legislation in the
2006 General Assembly session to further address the problem.76
Litigation will still remain a necessary, if not sufficient, tool
to address racial profiling.7 7 However, it is useful to contrast the
outcome of Bernard Flowers' case with the pro-active measures
taken by the General Assembly, to show that the courts alone
cannot be depended upon to protect racial minorities from the
indignity, humiliation and terror that flow from a traffic stop
generated by the color of the driver's skin. Action by other
branches of government is essential if this serious issue is to be
71. R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-21.2-5(b) (2004).
72. R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-21.2-5(a) (2004).
73. R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-21.2-5(c) (2004).
74. Farrell & McDevitt, supra note 65.
75. As was true in the first study, racial minorities remained more than
twice as likely as whites to be stopped and searched, though less likely to be
found with contraband once searched. Id.
76. "An Act Relating to Motor Vehicles," H 7590 (Feb. 16, 2006),
available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Billtext/BillTextO6/HouseTextO6/
H7590.pdf. Among other things, the bill would bar police from engaging in
pretext stops. No action was taken on the bill.
77. See, e.g., http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/26363prs
20060803.html, announcing the filing of a detailed settlement agreement in a
racial profiling suit against the Arizona Department of Public Safety. As this
article suggests, even the Flowers case itself helped spur the legislature into
taking action.
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addressed in a comprehensive manner.
III. "HOMELAND SECURITY"
It is no secret that the criminal laws - at the federal, state
and municipal level - are replete with silly, archaic and
antiquated prohibitions. 78  Rhode Island's statutes are no
exception. In establishing fines against individuals who "falsely
assume or pretend to be a . . . corder of wood, or fence viewer, '79
who "erect, locate or run any windmill within twenty-five (25) rods
of any traveled street or road,"80 or who "maliciously fire a musket
[or] blunderbuss.., within eighty (80) rods of any baiting place..
* actually used in the proper season for the baiting and netting of
wild pigeons,"81 Rhode Island's General Laws are filled with
quaint prohibitions of other long-bygone eras.
As amusing as these laws might seem, the consequences are
potentially severe when slumbering criminal statutes are
awakened especially when they can be used to infringe on
fundamental freedoms, including First Amendment rights. The
dangers are particularly heightened by the fact that prudential
issues of standing can often bar the courts from considering
constitutional challenges to such antiquated statutes until harm
has befallen a hapless defendant. 82
In 2004, Rhode Islanders witnessed firsthand the awakening
of a few such slumbering statutes. That year, Governor Donald
Carcieri proposed an 18-page "Act Relating to Homeland
78. Indeed, there has been a mini-cottage industry in the writing of books
about those laws. See, e.g., JEFF KOON, ANDY POWELL & WARD SCHUMAKER,
You MAY NOT TIE AN ALLIGATOR TO A FIRE HYDRANT: 101 REAL DUMB LAWS,
(2002); LANCE S. DAVIDSON, LUDICROUS LAWS AND MINDLESS MISDEMEANORS
(1998); ROBERT WAYNE PELTON, LOONY LAWS: THAT You NEVER KNEW YOU
WERE BREAKING (1990); SHERYL LINDSELL-ROBERTS, K.R. HOBBIE, TED
LEVALLIANT AND MARCEL THEROUX, WACKY LAWS, WEIRD DECISIONS, AND
STRANGE STATUTES (2004); LELAND H. GREGORY III, GREAT GOVERNMENT
GOOFS: OVER 350 LOOPY LAWS, HILARIOUS SCREW-UPS AND ACTS-IDENTS OF
CONGRESS (1997).
79. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-14-2 (2002).
80. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-22-5 (2002).
81. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-9 (2002).
82. For a thorough analysis of standing in the context of a pre-
enforcement challenge to a statute on First Amendment grounds, see Rhode
Island Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 29-33 (1st Cir.
1999).
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Security. '8 3 In a news release announcing its submission, the
Governor described the draft legislation as "designed to
strengthen Rhode Island's homeland security by sanctioning the
possession, manufacture, use or threatened use of chemical,
biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons, as well as the
intentional use or threatened use of industrial or commercial
chemicals as weapons. '84 In fact, this wide-ranging bill had
enormous ramifications for political protest, freedom of
association, academic freedom and the public's right to know.
Taking its cue from the controversial USA PATRIOT Act, the
proposed legislation broadly defined "terrorism," which carried a
sentence of life imprisonment, to cover any activity that (1) was
intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population" or
"influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or
coercion"8 5 and (2) involved "a violent act" or "an act dangerous to
human life" that violates the law.8 6
Political protest is, almost by definition, designed to
"influence the policy of a unit of government," and effective
protests will often have the goal of trying to "intimidate" or
"coerce" change in governmental policies. Under the legislation,
the commission of "a violent act" in the context of a protest could
turn the activity into a capital crime. The Governor's bill did not
define what constituted "a violent act," but the rest of the
proposed definition made clear that it did not have to be an act
"dangerous to human life." 87 Thus, committing a misdemeanor
assault, throwing a rock through a window or even engaging in
certain non-physical activity could turn a political protester into a
criminal facing life imprisonment.8 8
83. A copy of the draft bill is available on-line at
http://www.projo.com/news/pdf/securitybill.pdf. As a result of the storm of
criticism that greeted the bill, it was never formally introduced into the
General Assembly.
84. http://www.projo.com/news/pdf/20040212_legislativeagenda.pdf.
85. The definition included a third alternative more in keeping with most
people's notion of terrorism: an act intended to "affect the conduct of a unit of
government by murder, assassination, kidnapping or aircraft piracy."
86. "An Act Relating to Homeland Security," § 1, at
http://www.projo.com/news/pdf/securitybill.pdf. The USA Patriot Act's similar
definition of terrorism is codified at 18 U.S.C. §2331 (2001).
87. Id.
88. While defining violence as "unjust or unwarranted use of force,"
Black's Law Dictionary goes on to note that some courts "have held that
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Of particular note here, was the Governor's attempt to
explicitly ban speech related to "terrorism." He sought to do so by
resurrecting two long-dormant World War I-era statutes aimed at
criminalizing political dissent, and by expanding them to apply to
his new definition of terrorism. One such statute was enacted in
1919 that made it a felony, punishable by ten years in prison, to,
inter alia, "teach or advocate anarchy or the overthrow by force or
violence of the government," or to be "affiliated with any
organization teaching and advocating disbelief in or opposition to
organized government." 89 A companion statute referenced in the
Governor's legislation, and enacted in 1918, made it a felony to
"willfully speak, utter, print, write or publish any language"
intended to "incite, provoke or encourage" a "defiance or disregard
of the constitution or laws of Rhode Island or of the United
States."90  The Governor's legislation sought to expand both
violence in labor disputes is not limited to physical contact or injury, but may
include picketing conducted with misleading signs, false statements,
erroneous publicity, and veiled threats by words or acts." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1564 (7th ed. 1999).
89. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-43-12 (2002), repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 336, §5.
The unamended statute read in full:
§ 11-43-12 Advocating anarchy or unlawful destruction of property. -
Any person who shall willfully teach or advocate anarchy or the
overthrow by force or violence of the government of the state of
Rhode Island or of the United States, or of all forms of law, or
opposition to organized government, or any person who shall
willfully become a member of or affiliated with any organization
teaching and advocating disbelief in or opposition to organized
government, or advocating or teaching the duty, necessity, or
propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or
officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally of the
government of the state of Rhode Island or of the United States, or of
any organized government because of his, her, or their official
character, or advocating or teaching the unlawful destruction of
property, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000),
or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) years, or both.
90. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-43-11 (2002), repealed by P.L. 2004, ch. 336, §5.
The unamended statute read in full:
§ 11-43-11 Advocating forcible overthrow of government. - Any
person who shall willfully speak, utter, print, write, or publish any
language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage forceful resistance
to the state of Rhode Island or to the United States of America, or a
defiance or disregard of the constitution or laws of Rhode Island or of
the United States, or shall advocate any change, alteration, or
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statutes by also making it a felony merely to teach or advocate
"acts of terrorism" as defined by the bill. 91  Thus, the college
professor who enthusiastically assigned her students to read The
Autobiography of Emma Goldman could have faced ten years in
prison for that deed.
Both statutes were archaic remnants of an era when a person
could constitutionally be sent to jail for urging people to oppose
the draft,92 and when the First Amendment had not yet even been
deemed applicable to the states.93 But well before the Governor's
attempt to broaden the scope of these two statutes, their
unconstitutionality had become patent. Recognizing the vital
importance of free speech in a democratic society, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held for decades that mere advocacy of illegal
activity - even advocacy of violence - is entitled to the protection
of the First Amendment. As the Court noted in the seminal case
of Brandenburg v. Ohio, "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe
modification in the form of government of Rhode Island or of the
United States except in the manner provided by the constitution or
the laws of the state of Rhode Island or by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States, or shall advocate any change in the form
of government of the state of Rhode Island or of the United States by
means of revolution or violence, or shall advocate the assassination
of persons occupying public positions or offices created by the
constitution and laws of the state of Rhode Island or of the United
States, or shall advocate, incite, provoke, or encourage the
destruction, burning, blowing up, or damaging of any public or
private property as a part or incident of a program of force, violence,
or revolution, having for its purpose the overthrow of the form of
government of the state of Rhode Island or of the United States, or
shall willfully publicly display any flag or emblem, except the flag of
the United States, as symbolic or emblematic of the government of
the United States or of a form of government proposed by its
adherents or supporters as superior or preferable to the form of
government of the United States as prescribed by the Constitution of
the United States, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000),
or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) years, or both.
91. "An Act Relating to Homeland Security," §§ 2 and 4, at
http://www.projo.com/news/pdf/securitybill.pdf.
92. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
93. It was not until 1925, in dictum, that the Court "assumed" that
freedom of speech was "among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the states." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
20071 379
380 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12:361
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."94  The
Governor's bill ignored this fundamental principle, and in doing
so, severely undermined freedom of speech in the name of fighting
terrorism, just as the original statutes did in the name of fighting
anarchy. 95
The proposal's impact on academic freedom, political
discourse and public debate generally was enormous.
Fortunately, announcement of the Governor's legislation met with
immediate and uniform denunciation by academics, scholars and
other professionals. 96 In response, the Governor initially sought to
explain away his expansion of the two statutes by noting that he
was simply building upon already-existing laws.97 At the same
time, he acknowledged that he had not read his legislation in its
entirety before announcing its introduction. 98  Faced with a
continued drumbeat of criticism, he quickly announced that he
was withdrawing the proposal for re-working.99 Another version
never saw the light of day.
To its credit, the General Assembly was not content to let the
issue die. Learning a lesson from the Governor's revival of these
repressive laws, the legislature took the offensive and passed a bill
formally repealing the two statutes so they could never again be
used.10 0
In the same bill, the General Assembly repealed more than a
dozen other antiquated criminal statutes that had similarly
94. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added).
95. Other troubling provisions in the bill - severely undercutting the
public's right to know and significantly expanding the reach of the criminal
laws when broadly-defined "terrorist" conduct at issue - were analyzed in a
report prepared by the Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties
Union. The report is available on-line at
http://www.riaclu.org/misc/2004hs-bill-analysis.pdf.
96. Tom Mooney, Carcieri's Bill Shocks Constitutional Scholars,
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 19, 2004, available at http://www.projo.com/news/content
/projo-20040219_firstal9.23dedc.html.
97. Jim Baron, Carcieri Backs Off Legislation, PAWTUCKET TIMES, Feb.
20, 2004, available at http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=10998
298&BRD=1713&PAG=461&dept_id=24491&rfi=6.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 2004 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 336.
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troubling implications for the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. 101 At a time of a continuing "war on terrorism" and a
growing unpopular war in Iraq, it was hardly a stretch for
legislators to believe that threatened enforcement of these archaic
statutes - just as the Governor had threatened to enforce the two
"advocacy of anarchy" statutes - could also take place.
For example, the bill repealed statutes designed to "protect"
the United States flag. One of those statutes had banned, inter
alia, the public display of any flag "opposed to organized
government or which may be derogatory to morals."102  This
statute was enacted in 1909, and last amended in 1914 but had
been clearly unconstitutional since at least 1931, when the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down a very similar law. 10 3
Another "flag protection" statute, enacted in 1902, made it a
crime, with certain limited exceptions, to place "any word, figure,
mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement of any nature"
upon any flag of the United States, to sell or give away any
merchandise containing a representation of the U.S. flag in order
"to advertise, call attention to, mark, or distinguish the article or
substance on which so placed," or to "cast contempt, either by
words or act, upon any such flag." 104
These far-reaching prohibitions placed not just political
protesters, but literally hundreds of vendors and advertisers in
Rhode Island in violation of the law. In a series of rulings
commencing in 1969, when the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a man for speaking "contemptuous words about the
American flag,"'105 the Court had routinely struck down similar
statutes, including congressional efforts in the 1980's to ban flag
101. The sixteen criminal statutes that were the subject of the repeal bill
had certain things in common. Many of the laws dated back to 1896 (the first
codification of the Rhode Island General Laws), and the most recent of the
statutes was enacted in 1919. It appears that none of these statutes had been
enforced in modern history, and there were no reported court decisions
interpreting or applying any of these statutes since 1896. See 2004 R.I. Pub.
Laws ch. 336.
102. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-15-6 (2002), repealed by 2004 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.
336.
103. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
104. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-15-2 (2002), repealed by 2004 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch.
336.
105. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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desecration.106  Notwithstanding those rulings, overzealous
prosecutors across the country have continued to charge political
protesters with violations of "flag desecration" laws. 107
Yet another of the repealed statutes made it a crime for any
non-military personnel "to appear in public wearing the
distinctive uniform, or any distinctive part of a uniform, of any
branch of service," but gave the secretary of state unfettered
discretion to grant an exemption to "any reputable place of public
amusement or entertainment" in order to allow "members
performing in that place" to don such uniforms. 108 The statute
was first codified in 1896, and had not been amended since 1908.
Fortunately for the state's thriving artistic community (not to
mention young Halloween trick-or-treaters), neither the ban nor
the exemption had been enforced in modern times. Any attempt
to enforce the statute would have been futile, as giving a state
officer unbridled discretion to decide who could be exempt from
the ban for "entertainment" purposes raised fundamental First
Amendment problems. 109 In fact, over thirty years previously, at
the height of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down a similar federal ban's exemption for actors to wear
uniforms "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed
force."110
If it had not been for the Governor's misguided "homeland
security" legislation, efforts by the General Assembly to repeal
these laws might have seemed overly cautious, if not somewhat
paranoid. Even without the Governor's actions, however, it is
worth emphasizing that the resurrection of archaic statutes by the
government to target speech is not as rare as one might think.
106. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
107. As recently as July, 2006, a protester in Iowa who planted an upside
down flag in his front yard was charged with violating that state's flag
desecration statute. See http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0713-
26.htm.
108. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-14-3 (2002).
109. The general unconstitutionality of statutes providing unbridled
discretion to government officials to decide whether to grant permits for
speech activity has been clear since at least 1938. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938). See also, e.g., Fratiello v. Mancuso, 653 F. Supp. 775, 789
(D.R.I. 1987).
110. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
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For example, in 2003, the environmental organization
Greenpeace was indicted by the U.S. government for allegedly
violating an 1872 law banning "sailor mongering,"1 11 and for
engaging in conspiracy to violate that statute in violation of 18
U.S.C. §371.
The indictment arose from an incident where some members
of Greenpeace,
several miles outside the Port of Miami, boarded the MV
APL Jade, a cargo vessel which was believed to be
bringing illegally logged mahogany from Brazil into the
United States. The Greenpeace members, once on board,
intended to unfurl a banner which urged President Bush
to stop illegal logging, but they were taken into custody
before they could do so. 112
The arrested individuals pled guilty or no contest and were
sentenced to time served and required to pay fines ranging from
$100 to $500.'13 Not content with this resolution, however, the
Government obtained an indictment against Greenpeace itself.
Although raising serious questions about the viability of the
charges, a federal district court in Miami initially refused to
dismiss the indictment against the environmental organization,
but did grant Greenpeace's request for a jury trial.1 1 4 In its
opinion, the court began by noting that there were only two
reported cases, both more than 100 years old, that cited the
statute or its predecessor under which Greenpeace had been
indicted. 11 5 One of those cases discussed the statute's purpose,
which seemed far afield from the alleged actions of Greenpeace
and its members:
111. 18 U.S.C. 2279 (2002). The law in pertinent part reads:
Whoever, not being in the United States service, and not being duly
authorized by law for the purpose, goes on board any vessel about to
arrive at the place of her destination, before her actual arrival and
before she has been completely moored, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Id.
112. United States v. Greenpeace, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (S.D.Fla. 2004).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1256 (citing United States v. Sullivan, 43 F. 602 (D. Or. 1890);
United States v. Anderson, 24 F. Cas. 812 (S.D. N.Y. 1872)).
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The evil which this section is intended to prevent and
remedy is apparent, and in this district notorious. For
instance, lawless persons, in the interest or employ of
what may be called 'sailor-mongers,' get on board vessels
bound for Portland as soon as they get in the Columbia
river, and by the help of intoxicants, and the use of other
means, often savoring of violence, get the crews ashore,
and leave the vessel without help to manage or care for
her. The sailor thereby loses the wages of the voyage, and
is dependent on the boarding-house for the necessaries of
life, where he is kept, until sold by his captors to an
outgoing vessel, at an enormous price."16
In granting Greenpeace's request for a jury trial, the court
pointedly noted that the indictment was a "rare - and maybe
unprecedented - prosecution of an advocacy organization for
conduct having to do with the exposition of the organization's
message," and highlighted the allegations made by others that the
indictment was "politically motivated due to the organization's
criticism of President Bush's environmental policies."" 17
In a slightly less serious vein, but still worthy of note, was a
recent criminal case from Michigan, dubbed the "case of the
cussing canoeist,"118 that received a fair amount of national
attention. The case involved Timothy Boomer, who in 1998 was
charged with violating a 99-year-old Michigan statute when he
"uttered a stream of profanities" after he fell out of his canoe on
the Rifle River.119 The law at issue made it a misdemeanor to use
"any indecent, immoral, obscene, vulgar or insulting language in
the presence or hearing of any woman or child."120 It was not
until 2002, three and a half years after Boomer's initial conviction
of the charge and only after two lower courts had upheld the
constitutionality of the statute, that the Michigan Court of
116. Greenpeace, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 1256-57 (quoting Sullivan, 43 F. at
604-05).
117. Id. at 1264. One month later, the Court did throw out the charges,
pointing to vague language in the statute that it had referenced in its earlier
opinion. See http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/%5Cnews.aspx?id=13383.
118. See, e.g., Associated Press, Cussing Canoeist's Conviction Thrown Out
Along With 105 Year Old Law, Apr. 2, 2002, available at
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=15992.
119. People v. Boomer, 655 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. App. 2002).
120. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.337 (2006).
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Appeals let the cussing canoeist off the hook by declaring the 1897
statute unconstitutional. 121
As these examples show, a true danger exists when
antiquated laws are allowed to remain on the books. Under well-
recognized rules of standing, a statute's legality generally cannot
be challenged until a person is either charged under the law or
faces a credible threat of prosecution. 122 Sometimes, as these
cases demonstrate all too well, that will be too late. These
situations present a classic opportunity for legislative, rather than
judicial, action. The Rhode Island General Assembly took
important steps in repealing statutes that were, at best, outdated,
and at worst dangerous. It would do well to regularly review the
General Laws and remove similar archaic statutes.
121. Boomer, 655 N.W.2d at 255.
122. See, e.g., Rhode Island Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d
26, 29-33 (1st Cir. 1999).
2007]
